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Abstract 
 
  This paper uses a survey of 932 rural households to uncover how the rural 
credit market operates in four provinces of Vietnam. Households obtain 
credit through formal and informal lenders. Formal loans are almost entirely 
for production and asset accumulation, while informal loans are used for 
consumption smoothening. Interest rates fell from 1997 to 2002, reflecting 
increased market integration. Moreover, the determinants of formal and 
informal credit demand are distinct. While credit rationing depends on 
education and credit history, in particular, regional differences in the 
demand for credit are striking. A ‘one size fits all’ approach to credit policy 
in Vietnam would be inappropriate.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Vietnam has come a long way since the doi moi reform process was initiated in 1986, 
and the past 15 years have witnessed one of the best performances in the world in terms 
of both economic growth and poverty reduction. People’s living standards have 
improved significantly, and the country’s socio-economic achievements are impressive. 
Wide-ranging institutional reforms have been introduced, including greater reliance on 
market forces in the allocation of resources and the determination of prices. A shift can 
also be noted from an economy dominated by the state and co-operative sectors to a 
situation where the private sector and foreign investment account for a relatively high 
proportion of GDP. Important strides have been made over a relatively short time span 
to further the transition from a centrally planned to a socialist market economy. Finally, 
while the ratio of credit to GDP is almost twice as high in Thailand and three times as 
high in China and Malaysia (see World Bank, 2005), the financial deepening of the 
Vietnamese economy that has taken place during the past decade is remarkable.  
 
Nevertheless, Vietnam remains a poor country. Some 70 percent of the population 
continues to live in rural areas, and they depend on agriculture for their livelihood. How 
the country can transform itself and its agricultural sector to a more modern society 
remains a critical policy challenge. Access to credit for smallholders is as elsewhere a 
key ingredient in the promotion of agricultural production and transformation. It forms 
an essential element of any poverty oriented strategy for the future development of the 
financial system.1 Access to credit affects as aptly demonstrated by Diagne, Zeller and 
Sharma (2000) household welfare through at least two key channels. First, it alleviates 
capital constraints on agricultural households. This can significantly improve the ability 
of poor households to procure needed agricultural inputs, and will also reduce the 
opportunity costs of capital-intensive assets, encouraging labour-saving technology and 
raising labour productivity. The second channel identified by Diagne et al. is that credit 
access increases the risk-bearing capacity of households, altering risk-coping strategies. 
Households with access to credit may be more willing to pursue promising but risky 
technologies, and will be better able to avoid adopting risk-reducing but inefficient 
livelihood strategies.  
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 The above kinds of considerations have as elsewhere in the developing countries led the 
Vietnamese Government and its donor community to set up credit programmes aimed at 
expanding rural households’ access to credit; and significant expansion is foreseen in 
the coming years (see World Bank, 2003). The reliance on informal credit continues, 
however, to be widespread. Formal and informal credit market segments are present in 
Vietnam much along the lines of the dual credit market described by for example 
Mohieldin and Wright (2000). They cite Hoff and Stiglitz (1993), and point out – with 
reference to Egypt – that there are two competing views as to why formal and informal 
credit markets co-exist. First, government may intervene, capping interest rates, and this 
remains the case in Vietnam. The alternative view that differences in the cost of 
screening, monitoring and contract enforcement across lenders lead to fragmentation 
appears, however, also to carry explanatory power. Similarly, the interaction between 
the formal and informal credit market segments is open to conflicting interpretations. 
This is evident in the theoretical papers by for example Gupta and Chaudhuri (1997) 
and Chaudhuri (2001), on the one hand, and the careful empirical work by Zeller 
(1994), Diagne (1999) and Diagne, Zeller and Sharma (2000) on Madagascar, Malawi 
and Bangladesh, on the other. Diagne and co-authors highlight that understanding how 
informal institutions serve the financial needs of households and interact with the 
formal credit institutions is important, especially for ‘sustainable and market-oriented 
financial institutions that plan to expand and complement the services offered by the 
existing informal credit market rather than substitute for them’. Diagne, Zeller and 
Sharma also offer a concise methodological review, which together with papers by 
Kochar (1997) and Petrick (2005) provide general analytical background for the present 
work on Vietnam. Kochar points out in the context of India that the literature on rural 
credit has generally assumed that households are rationed in their access to subsidized 
‘formal’ credit; but she adds that the validity of this assumption hinges on the level of 
effective demand for formal credit, which is in turn a function of the demand for credit 
and its availability from ‘informal’ sources. This implies that the extent of credit market 
rationing may be smaller than regularly assumed. We take these cautioning findings 
serious and rely on them in our attempt to get credit demand right in our study of formal 
and informal rural credit in Vietnam. 
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 In any case, a key motivation for our paper is that very little is actually known about the 
rural credit market in Vietnam, including both its degree of efficiency and the extent to 
which credit rationing impedes agricultural development. Appropriate development of 
market institutions based on well informed policies is a key prerequisite for success in 
Vietnam’s ongoing transformation from a command-type to a more market based 
economy. Generating policy relevant insights into the characteristics and functioning of 
the rural credit market are on this background well justified. It is in this context helpful 
that the general academic literature on rural credit markets and their importance in 
developing countries (including the analysis of determinants of credit demand and the 
characteristics of credit constrained households) has seen a welcome expansion during 
the last 15 years. This has followed Japelli (1990) and Feder et al. (1990).2 They relied 
on respectively household survey data from the US and China, and this methodological 
approach has subsequently been put to good use in most of the papers cited above. Our 
study is situated within this literature, and it relies on the methodological approach, 
which Diagne, Zeller and Sharma (2000) refer to as the ‘direct method’. Accordingly, 
our household survey data allow us to establish whether households are credit 
constrained or not. They do not permit an analysis where the extent to which a 
household is credit constrained is in focus, even if we agree this would be desirable.  
 
In sum, in this paper we provide a detailed review and an in-depth econometric analysis 
of how the rural credit market operates in four provinces of Vietnam, with a focus on 
basic characteristics and differences between the formal and informal credit markets.3 
We use a new survey of 932 households designed to elicit the full credit history of 
households during 1997 to 2002. These data are combined with information from the 
2002 Vietnam Household Living Standard Survey (VHLSS) in the econometric 
analysis, where the determinants of credit demand and credit rationing are identified 
more rigorously. We are in this process able to account carefully for possible self 
selection.  
 
The paper is structured as follows. After describing the data in Section 2, we provide in 
Section 3 a detailed descriptive overview of the characteristics of the rural credit market 
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with a focus on the division between formal and informal credit. The data set has a time 
dimension, so trends during the 1997-2002 years can be spelled out, including 
developments in overall interest rates. In Section 4, we apply the econometric 
framework to identify the determinants of credit demand, and proceed to analyse in 
Section 5 household characteristics, which potentially influence the probability of being 
credit rationed. Some key policy measures to further the allocation of rural credit in 
Vietnam and develop the credit market overall are discussed in the concluding Section 
6.  
 
2. DATA 
 
Key data used in this paper (including in particular information on the demand for 
credit) were generated in a comprehensive household survey of land, labour and credit 
markets in the provinces of Long An, Quang Nam, Ha Tay and Phu Tho. The survey, 
also known as the ILSSA Access to Resources Survey,4 was carried out in the first 
quarter of 2003 in collaboration among the Institute of Labour Science and Social 
Affairs (ILSSA), Mekong Economics, the University of Copenhagen and the Stockholm 
School of Economics (see Mekong Economics, 2004). A total of 932 rural households 
were surveyed. These households are identical to the rural households previously 
interviewed in quarter 1 and 2 in the rural areas of the four provinces under study here 
as part of the nationally representative 2002 Vietnam Household Living Standard 
Survey (VHLSS).5 In the VHLSS 2002, data were collected on income, expenditure and 
various other background variables. This largely pre-determined information is used in 
this paper in combination with our own data, collected about a year later to construct 
explanatory variables.6
 
The four provinces studied are located in four different regions of Vietnam as follows: 
(i) Long An in the fertile Mekong Delta, which is also the most densely populated of the 
four provinces; (ii) Quang Nam in the sparsely populated Central Highlands; (iii) Phu 
Tho in the North Western (Highlands), a mountainous region with a high share of ethnic 
minorities, and (iv) Ha Tay in the Red River Delta surrounding Hanoi, the Capital of 
Vietnam. The ILSSA survey is not nationally representative, but it is representative for 
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rural households in the four provinces under study. They cover a lot of the variation in 
geographical and socio-economic conditions present in Vietnam, including regional 
differences between the north, centre and south of the country. 
 
The ILSSA survey covered a large variety of topics related to land, labour and credit. In 
this paper, we rely on the credit component, including a number of illuminating 
questions on the source and use of loans, designed to elicit the full credit history of 
households during the recent past.7 The general purpose of this part of the questionnaire 
was to help clarify the functioning of rural credit markets in Vietnam and to assess the 
extent to which credit rationing constrains agricultural development.8 Questions 
covered issues such as (i) number of loans applied for and actually received, including 
information on amounts involved, interest, period and source of the credit, (ii) whether 
the household had at some point wanted to apply for a loan, but refrained from doing so, 
and (iii) various other relevant background such as the use of the loan, collateral 
requirements etc. 
 
3. THE RURAL CREDIT MARKET 
 
Due to the design of the questionnaire the credit history of each household in the sample 
can be followed. Table 1 shows the distribution of households by the number of loans 
obtained. 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
Over the period from the beginning of 1997 to 2002, a total of 289 households did not 
obtain any credit at all. However, 69 percent of the sample (643 households) obtained at 
least one loan, and around 46 percent (432) obtained more than one loan. Table 1 also 
reveals that there are differences among the four provinces. In Quang Nam less than 50 
percent of the households obtained a loan, whereas 71 percent secured at least one loan 
in Ha Tay. In Phu Tho and Long An around 80 percent of the households participated in 
the credit market. If we focus on households with more than one loan, Ha Tay and Phu 
Tho are quite similar with more that 50 percent having more than one loan. In Quang 
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Nam only 7 percent of the households obtained more than one loan in contrast to Long 
An where the corresponding share is more than two thirds.  
 
Of the 289 households, who did not participate in the credit market during the period 
under study, only 12 got a loan application rejected, and another 65 reported having at 
some point refrained from applying even though they wanted credit. Thus, many of the 
289 households can be seen as not effectively demanding credit. In sum, the overall 
picture emerging from Table 1 is that an active rural credit market exists in Vietnam and 
that regional differences are sizeable. 
 
(a) General trends  
 
The supply side of the rural credit market in Vietnam includes a number of formal and 
informal lending institutions. The Vietnam Bank for Agriculture and Rural 
Development (VBARD) is the biggest formal lender, and the much smaller Vietnam 
Bank for the Poor (VBP) is associated with VBARD.9 VBP specialises in lending to 
poorer households. The credit market in many developing countries is characterised by 
segmentation in formal and informal sectors (see for example Zeller, 1994 and Yadav et 
al., 1992). Table 2 shows the distribution of loans by source of credit in terms of both 
percentages of all loans and percentages of all loans weighted with loan size. As 
revealed in Table 2, there is a sizeable informal credit sector in Vietnam. The informal 
sector consists of private money lenders, friends and relatives,10 responsible for 35 
percent of all loans in 2002.  
 
In terms of loan amounts, the importance of the informal sector declined from 21 
percent in 1999 to 17 percent in 2002, but measured by the actual number of loans the 
relative importance of the informal sector actually increased slightly. The figures in 
Table 2 compare well with previous work on credit markets in Vietnam. Duong and 
Izumida (2002), using data from a small household survey undertaken in 1995, found 
that the informal sector accounted for 17 percent of all loans. 
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[Table 2 about here] 
 
‘Others’ include private banks, which have expanded rapidly in the south of Vietnam in 
recent years, and the sector composition of the rural credit market differs markedly 
among provinces. In Long An the formal sector provided 96 percent of the total loan 
amount in 2002 whereas only 64 percent came from the formal sector in Phu Tho, as 
further discussed in Section 3.3. 
 
In what follows, we divide the rural credit market into three different segments, one 
formal and two informal. The formal segment includes all formal institutions,11 while 
the informal sector consists of (i) private lending by unrelated individuals and friends 
charging interest, and (ii) lending from families, relatives and friends carrying zero 
interest. These two segments will be referred to as ‘private’ and ‘family’ in what 
follows. The distinction between friends, who lend and charge interest, and friends, who 
lend charging zero interest, may seem arbitrary. However, the data reveal a marked 
discontinuity at zero interest. Friends, who lend and charge interest, charge on average 
only slightly less than private money lenders (not characterised as friends).  
 
To illustrate developments in the rural credit market in the late 1990s and early years of 
the new millennium, Table 3 shows the number of loans, the average loan size (in 
nominal terms) and the average monthly interest rate for the three different segments, 
year by year. To judge the magnitude of real interest rates the average monthly 
consumer price inflation for each year is also shown. The nominal overall volume of 
credit expanded rapidly by a factor of 2.6 in the years from 1999 to 2002. During this 
period Vietnam experienced an average annual consumer price inflation rate of around 
1.5 percent, so the credit volume in real terms grew at about 6 percent less than the 
nominal growth. 
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
Looking at the number of loans disbursed in the period, relatives and the informal sector 
increased their share from 29 to 36 percent, but in terms of loan amounts formal sector 
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lending increased significantly. Formal credit accounted for 76 percent of total rural 
credit in 1997. By 2002 this share was 83 percent. The remaining 17 percent was 
divided almost equally between informal loans and loans from relatives. 
 
The trend described above is mirrored in the development of loan sizes in the three 
segments. While loan size increased steadily in the formal sector, it remained almost 
constant for friends and relatives and decreased substantially in the interest bearing part 
of the informal sector. 
 
Table 3 also allows us to investigate the development in loan terms. One striking feature 
is that overall interest rates have fallen – and more so for informal sector loans. The 
trend for real interest rates is less clear due to fluctuating inflation over the period. 
However, real interest rates in the formal sector for 2002 are in the low end for the 
period, and for the informal interest bearing segment there has been steady decline. The 
interest rate gap between the formal and informal sector was around 0.9 percentage 
point (per month) in 2002. The relatively large fall in the interest rate in the informal 
sector (for interest bearing loans) is clearly related to the general increase in rural 
incomes, which made borrowing less risky. This has tended to push interest rates down, 
and the same goes for the increase in formal credit possibilities during the period. 
Another factor behind the interest rate fall is that monopoly rents obtained by private 
moneylenders are likely to have fallen in line with increased market integration. 
Increased access to collateral (in the form of red books, which are land tenure 
certificates issued by local authorities) have squeezed profit margins and the degree of 
risk associated with the portfolios of informal lenders.  
 
Table 3 confirms that the combined informal sector is important in Vietnam with 36 per 
cent of the total number of loans in 2002. The interest bearing segment made up 14 
percentage points hereof and about half in value terms. This suggests that poor rural 
households in Vietnam continue to rely on networks and relatives when they try to deal 
with shocks and face hard times. This is in line with what is generally found in the 
literature on rural households in developing countries, see Platteau (1997). 
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Looking at the changes in the structure of the credit market it is of interest to relate 
these to potential changes in the use of approved loans. Table 4 shows that such changes 
were limited in the sample.12 It is highlighted that to increase the probability that the 
correct use of each loan was elicited, we asked both about the stated purpose in the loan 
application and about what the loan was actually used for.13 Combining answers to 
these two questions suggests that loans were generally used as stated in the applications. 
In all years differences were identified in less than 5 percent of the loans, and these 
differences are not systematic in any way. However, even if loans are generally used for 
the purpose applied for, fungibility in the form of substitution and diversion – using the 
terminology of Von Pischke and Adams (1980) – can still be present. Substitution 
occurs when a household obtains a loan for a project or part of a project the household 
would still have undertaken in the absence of the loan. Diversion of a (small) part of the 
loan to other purposes can happen even if the main share of the loan is still used for the 
purpose stated in the application. Table 4 mainly indicates that changes in the structure 
of the credit market are not driven by changes in loan composition in terms of use of 
loans.  
 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
(b) Land and credit market interaction 
 
Credit is obtained for many reasons, such as consumption smoothening and investment. 
Investment in land (including in particular land transactions) is critically important for 
the development of a market based economy and for the efficiency of the economy in 
general. It is therefore of interest to uncover any interactions between the credit and 
land markets. The credit and land sections of the ILSSA questionnaire were on this 
background designed to capture such relationships through a variety of questions; and it 
is apparent from the data that land (especially with a red book) is widely used as 
collateral in Vietnam.  
 
In Long An province no less than 99 percent of the total number of loans involved 
collateral in the form of land with a red book. In Ha Tay, Phu Tho and Quang Nam the 
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corresponding shares were 31, 77 and 63 percent. Thus, land plays not only a significant 
– but a fundamental – role in determining the operation of the credit market, including 
who gets access to credit. The opposite statement cannot be made. There is almost no 
credit-based land acquisition reflected in the data as would be the case in a more 
developed market economy. Only six loans were granted for buying land during the 
period studied. This appears credible, partly since there is no evidence in the data that 
the use of loans was misstated, and partly because of the still underdeveloped nature of 
land ownership and land transactions in Vietnam.  
 
(c) Rural credit in 2002 
 
In this section we look in more detail at loans obtained in 2002. It is the most recent 
year from which data are available, and they provide the best up-to-date picture of the 
rural credit market in Vietnam. Table 5 illustrates some subtle differences between 
loans obtained in the different segments of the loan market. Arguably, the definition of 
the formal segment is broad (see the list of institutions in Appendix A). Nevertheless, 
the differences are illuminating. 
 
[Table 5 about here] 
 
The differences in terms of volume and loan size were already evident from Table 3. 
Loans from the formal sector have an average duration of 15 months. The duration is 
shorter in the interest carrying informal sector, but with an average of nine months, it is 
clear that this segment of the loan market is not only used for short term purposes. 
Borrowing from friends and relatives at zero interest is either for a short period or no 
specific duration is agreed for the loan. A total of 87 percent of the loans among friends 
have no formal length specified, suggesting that this kind of loan typically involves 
lending among family members or close friends. Around half (56 percent) of the interest 
carrying informal loans from private lenders also have no duration specified. This 
suggests that some households may be at risk of not generating enough income to enter 
into specified agreements, including regularly scheduled payments. Studying this group 
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in greater detail would be highly policy relevant from a vulnerability point of view, but 
is beyond the scope of this paper. 
 
The default rate is the percentage of loans in each segment where households have 
defaulted, including non-payment of interest or repayment of the principal. The 
magnitude of the figures is hard to assess. One reason is that the principal is paid in full 
at the end of the loan term for most formal loans, so only interest payments are made 
regularly. Paying both interest and principal at the end of the agreed loan period is also 
quite common. Thus, an eight percent default rate within a period of one year (as shown 
in Table 5) is substantial if this involves non-payment of interest only. On the other 
hand, it is not clear from the data whether this payment came forward sometime later or 
whether the household simply stopped paying instalments on the loan. 
 
Collateral is used for 70 percent of all formal loans whereas no collateral is needed in 
the informal sector. Land with red book is used as collateral in the majority of the loans. 
House and land without red book are also used, but to a lower degree, and there are as 
already alluded to significant regional differences in the use of collateral.  
 
Table 5 confirms that Ha Tay and Phu Tho both have about 50 percent of the loans in 
the formal segment, whereas Long An and Quang Nam have much higher shares for this 
sector. In Long An almost 90 percent of the loans originate in the formal sector. This 
corresponds well with the perception that southern Vietnam (where Long An is situated) 
is relatively more ‘market-based’ than other regions of the country. Similarly, although 
households in Quang Nam obtain close to 80 percent of their loans in the formal sector, 
it is clear that very few households obtain any credit at all, reflecting the very 
underdeveloped nature of the economy of this province. The bottom of Table 5 provides 
information on the distribution of loans by different sources. The main difference is 
between Quang Nam and Long An, on the one hand, and Ha Tay and Phu Tho, on the 
other. 
 
The above differences suggest that different segments in the loan market serve different 
needs. In Table 6 this is further explored by tabulating the use of loans in the three 
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credit segments. The formal sector focuses almost entirely on demand for production 
loans and asset accumulation.14 A higher share of loans from the informal sector is 
directed towards health expenditure and consumption. These loans are likely to be due 
to household shocks or unforeseen events. They carry a higher interest rate than those 
obtained in the formal sector, showing that households rely on loans from the informal 
sector to cope with shocks and unforeseen events due to lower transaction costs and 
more flexible terms of lending. It is also worth noting that more than 50 percent of the 
interest bearing loans from the informal sector is for production purposes, 
demonstrating the importance of this loan segment for the growth process of Vietnam.  
 
[Table 6 about here] 
 
4. DETERMINANTS OF CREDIT DEMAND 
 
Basic characteristics and differences between the formal and informal credit markets 
were in focus above. In this section, an econometric framework is applied to identify 
more rigorously the level and determinants of credit demand at the household level. We 
restrict ourselves to credit demand in 2002 since this is the most recent year for which 
data are available and as such provide the most up-to-date picture of credit demand in 
Vietnam. Moreover, focusing on 2002 allows us to consider the explanatory variables 
relied on in this section as pre-determined as further discussed below. 
 
In a setup where only matched (i.e. approved) loan applications are observable, the 
analyst cannot hope to identify correctly the characteristics affecting real credit demand 
at the household level. However, even with knowledge about rejected loan applications, 
identification of ‘self constrained’ households is normally complex and challenging. We 
are fortunate in the present paper that we have the information required to address these 
identification problems. Consequently, we are able to categorize households as 
demanding credit if they (i) obtained a loan, (ii) had a loan rejected or (iii) did not apply 
even if they wanted credit.  
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The underlying structural framework for analysing credit demand is a household 
production model with utility maximizing households, who demand credit (demand = 1) 
if a loan is expected to increase utility, and they do not demand credit (demand = 0) in 
the opposite case. If a household demands credit the size of the loan applied for is 
determined by variables related to the optimal investment if the loan is for investment 
purposes or the optimal consumption loan if the loan is for consumption. This 
framework leads to a hurdle model where demand for credit is first characterized by a 
probit model. Thus,  
 
(( 1) ( , ,i c pP demand h H X D= = Φ ))     (1) 
where h is a linear function of the vectors of explanatory variables:  is a vector of 
household characteristics, 
iH
cX captures village characteristics and  represents 
province dummies. The expected value of the amount of credit demanded given the 
household demands credit is described by a lognormal model such that: 
pD
 
{ } ( )2log( ) 1, ( , , ) ~ ( , , ),i c p i c ploanamount demand g H X D N g H X D σ=  (2) 
The function is a linear form of the same explanatory variables as in the 
probit model for whether or not to demand credit. The parameters in this stage can be 
estimated by OLS
( , ,i c pg H X D )
15. From the demand equation (1) and the level equation (2), the 
expected level of credit demand conditional on explanatory variables is given by: 
  
( ) ( ) ( ) 2) , , , , exp , , / 2i c p i c p i c pE loanamount H X D h H X D g H X D σ⎡ ⎤ ⎡= Φ + ⎤⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦  (3) 
 
At the household level human capital controls include age and education of the 
household head, a proxy for the information level (a dummy capturing whether the 
newspaper ‘People’ is read or not), and productive assets. These are total land holdings, 
number of adults as a proxy for labour power, and feed expenditure as a proxy for the 
size of livestock holdings. We also control for the value of total household assets and 
the need for obtaining credit by including the number of dependents. Furthermore, a 
proxy is included to capture shocks at the household level in the form of a dummy 
 14
showing whether a household member was hospitalized within the last 12 months. The 
gender of the household head is also included, and we control for ‘connectedness’ 
through the use of a dummy, indicating whether anyone in the household has 
acquaintances in the existing credit institutions. Credit history is controlled for through 
the variable ‘not paid’ capturing whether a household has defaulted, i.e. not made a 
repayment on a loan in full or in part on a loan obtained prior to 2001. Finally, we take 
account of the influence of security of land tenure by including the share of household 
land area for which a red book is in hand.  
 
Village level information includes distance to the district centre where VBARD/VBP 
has an office, and four province dummies capture whether households live in Ha Tay, 
Phu Tho, Quang Nam or Long An. 
  
In the present analysis data for the following explanatory variables originate from the 
VHLSS 2002: age, gender, education, adults, dependents, animal feed, total assets, 
distance, information, and hospitalization. These data were collected about one year 
before the ILSSA survey. They therefore precede our information on credit demand in 
2002 by about one year. This allows us to treat these data as pre-determined. In addition 
to the provincial dummies, data for the remaining explanatory variables, i.e. total land, 
connections, credit history and share of land covered by a red book, come from the 
ILSSA survey. Since land ownership was collected with a time dimension we can use 
the amount of land owned in 2001, which is exogenous to credit demand in 2002. 
Connectedness is measured by a dummy variable constructed based on responses to 
whether anyone in the sampled households has close personal contacts in the existing 
credit institutions that go beyond a standard customer relationship.  
 
Two sets of summary statistics are given in Table 7. The first two columns show for 
each variable the number of observations for which data is available in the total sample 
of 932 households used in Section 3. However, information is missing on distance and 
total assets for respectively 40 and 15 households (with no overlap). In addition, two 
households had no land in 2001. Accordingly, the last five columns provide summary 
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statistics for the 875 households used in the empirical analysis, and they will be referred 
to as the full sample in what follows.16
 
[Table 7 about here] 
 
It is clear from Table 7 that the reduction in sample size due to missing observations is 
not important. Means change very little. The age of the household head ranges from 22 
to 93 years, and some 20 percent of households are female headed. In addition, the 
education variable confirms that household heads have on average more than six years 
of schooling. Other observations include that while the average land area is small (i.e. 
around two thirds of a hectare) there are indeed a few households with large 
landholdings and substantial assets in the form of livestock. Moreover, 19 percent of all 
households in the full sample had at least one member in hospital during 2002, and 21 
percent of households read the newspaper ‘People’. Finally, some 8 percent of 
households have defaulted on a loan, and 79 percent of the total household land area 
was registered with a red book. 
 
We hypothesize that productive capital (land holdings, number of adults and livestock 
holdings) will affect the propensity to demand credit and the level demanded positively. 
For example, the greater the landholdings the more likely a farmer is to demand credit 
to provide access to fertilizer and other inputs. The coefficient on the education of the 
household head is likewise expected to have a positive sign as greater ability and human 
capital should affect investment possibilities. Similarly, being better connected, 
informed and with secure land rights in the form of red books should have a positive 
impact on credit demand. Finally, many dependents and a person hospitalized in the last 
12 months are proxies for a higher probability of the household being in need of credit. 
They are thus more likely to have a loan demand. 
 
A priori expectations about the signs of the variables capturing the age and sex of the 
household head and credit history are less clear. A number of different arguments may 
hold, so these variables are included as controls without well defined priors. The same 
can be said for the total asset base, which could theoretically affect the probability of 
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obtaining a loan both negatively and positively. A larger asset base would tend to make 
self financing of loans more viable. On the other hand, it may also improve the loan 
terms, which the household are offered, making it cheaper to obtain a loan.  
 
It is expected that the distance (village) coefficient is negative. The further away the 
household lives from the district centre the more costly it is for the household to obtain 
the loan, due to for example travel costs. This argument will not necessarily hold if the 
household directs demand towards a local moneylender. Yet, in remote villages local 
moneylenders are likely to hold more monopoly lending power, demanding stricter 
repayment conditions (which we do not control for) and thus discourage demand for 
credit. 
 
Table 8 reports results from estimation of equation (1) and (2) together with marginal 
effects. As explained previously the four regions where data is sampled from are diverse 
with respect to geography and economic development. To account for this and to 
investigate if coefficients differ between regions, variables of central interest were 
augmented with regional dummy interaction terms in the demand equation.17 
Specifically, land holdings, education, distance to village centre, gender and the share of 
landholdings with a red book were interacted with regional dummy variables. We 
estimated this large model on the loan demand equation (results not reported) and 
retained in all subsequent regressions the interaction terms which were either 
individually significant or where the joint test of insignificance failed when including 
that variable. The procedure suggested that land area be augmented with a dummy for 
Long An province, distance with Quang Nam and Phu Tho dummy variables and 
possession of red book also with a Quang Nam dummy. The augmented variables are 
listed in the tables under their ‘main’ counterpart labelled with the province name for 
which the variable is augmented.  
  
Apart from results on our full sample of 875 households, Table 8 shows the demand 
equation estimated on a sample which is reduced by removing 58 households, who 
obtained a zero interest loan from friends (column 4). The motives for demanding credit 
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in this situation may differ from the framework set up above, and we wish to uncover 
whether our results are robust to removing these households.  
 
[Table 8 about here] 
 
It emerges from Table 8 that the probit regressions based on the full and the reduced 
sample are actually quite similar. Magnitude, significance levels and signs are (with one 
insignificant exception) the same for all variables. Therefore, we focus on the results 
from the full sample. 
 
The results confirm as expected that land is a statistically significant determinant of 
credit demand. However, the nature of this impact differs between Long An and the 
three other provinces. Outside Long An the probability of demanding credit increases 
with land size but this is not the case for the size of the loan. For Long An province the 
opposite is true. While the size of land holdings have virtually no impact on the 
probability of demanding credit, the amount obtained depends significantly on 
landholdings. However, in economic terms the effects are not large. In Long An, an 
extra 1,000 m2 of land gives a 1.4 percentage point larger loan, whereas the probability 
of demanding credit goes up with 0.66 percentage points for an additional 1,000 m2 in 
the three other provinces. There are as already referred to above many reasons for 
expecting that land should be significant, and it is reassuring that this is reflected in the 
data. The connectedness variable is positive, large and strongly significant, which 
confirms that being connected has clear and positive impact on credit demand. As 
indicated above no province differences were found for the connectedness variable, and 
no impact is found on the loan size. This suggests that connectedness works through 
increased knowledge of opportunities rather than through preferential treatment. The 
number of adults affects credit demand strongly both in terms of statistical and 
economic significance. An extra adult in the household increases the probability of 
demanding credit with more than 3 percentage points, ceteris paribus. Apart from 
increased investment possibilities more adults also increase the scope for demand for 
consumption loans. Assets and the proxy for livestock holdings (feed) have small or no 
effect on the probability of demanding credit, but they affect the credit amount given a 
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loan was obtained positively and significantly. The effects on loan size are small in 
economic terms. For instance, a doubling of livestock holdings (feed) from its mean 
level results in a 5 percent increase in loan size given the household obtains a loan. 
However, this result does confirm that when a household has productive assets (in this 
case livestock) the demand for credit goes up. The age of the household head is also 
significant, but the older the household head the less credit is demanded. This in all 
likelihood reflects that older people in the provinces studied are more settled and less 
likely to take new and capital demanding initiatives. Cultural values may play a role 
here as well.  
 
Table 8 reveals very interesting differences in credit demand among the provinces under 
study. Recalling that Ha Tay is the base, there are large significant differences between 
Ha Tay and the three regional dummy variables for Phu Tho, Quang Nam and Long An. 
Controlling for other factors the demand for credit is lower in Phu Tho and Quang Nam 
than in Ha Tay and Long An (with a significant positive coefficient). Demand is lowest 
in Quang Nam, although not significantly lower than in Phu Tho, and highest in Long 
An. The differences have large economic significance as well. For otherwise similar 
households being located in Long An entails a 50 percent increase in the probability of 
demanding credit. This is further compounded when taking into account the differences 
in the amount of credit given a loan is obtained, and the marginal effects on the 
unconditional (on having a loan) expectation of household credit amount. These 
observations correspond well with the respective level of development of the provinces 
studied, and it confirms that credit issues are going to remain key challenges as the 
transformation of the Vietnamese economy proceeds. Apart from the effect of land 
holdings as discussed above, regional differences are also present with respect to 
distance from the village centre. Relative to Ha Tay province greater distance has a 
positive impact on the probability of demanding credit in Phu Tho. The opposite is the 
case in Quang Nam. While it is not obvious to see what is driving the result for Phu 
Tho, the finding for Quang Nam is in line with the prior expectation of this 
mountainous region. Finally, among the statistically significant variables, it is worth 
noting the coefficient on the variable ‘Red book’ – the share of land holding under the 
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red book. For Quang Nam the coefficient is large and positive while for the base (i.e. 
the other three provinces) it is small and negative.  
 
It is important to keep in mind that pooling demand for formal and informal credit risks 
blurring the picture of rural credit demand. It is likely that there are differences in the 
way in which the various households and other characteristics affect formal credit 
relative to informal credit demand. Distance to the district centre (office of a formal 
lender) may for example be negatively related to demand for formal credit and 
positively related to demand for informal credit. It is also sensible to expect that 
households with a problematic credit history are more likely to demand credit through 
the informal market. Finally, it is probably also correct that negative shocks like having 
a household member hospitalized is more directly correlated with informal credit 
demand. Households may well perceive it as difficult to obtain consumption loans from 
formal credit sources.   
 
To explore this, Table 9 presents results of probit regressions where formal and 
informal credit demand is studied separately in a bivariate probit model where non-
independence in the error term is allowed for. Thus, using i to indicate households, 
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1 1 1 1 1
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2 2 2 2 2
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1 0,0 (
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z if z q otherwise demand for formal credit
z if z q otherwise demand for informal credit
β ε
β ε
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)
)
 (4) 
 
where 1iε  and 2iε  have mean zero and unit variance (for normalisation), such that 
formally 1 2( , )i iε ε ~ (0,0,1,1, )zbinorm ρ , and zρ  is the coefficient of correlation.  is a 
vector of explanatory variables with the first element being one, and 
jq
jβ  a conformable 
vector of coefficients to be estimated, 1,2j = . Our interest is whether factors 
determining credit demand differ between the formal and informal sectors, thus we ask 
whether 1 2β β= . The explanatory variables used here are the same as those relied on in 
Table 8. 
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The reported test for independence between the equations shows that the null hypothesis 
of independence cannot be rejected. Specifying an individual probit regression for each 
equation yields almost the exact same result (not reported) as the bivariate model. 
 
Analogous to the results from the pooled formal and informal credit markets presented 
in Table 8, Table 9 shows determinants of logarithmic loan size and marginal effects 
conditioning on the households obtaining a loan in respectively the formal and informal 
sector (column 2, 3, 5 and 6).18
 
As regards the distinction between formal credit, on the one hand, and informal credit, 
on the other, it is clear why some of the insignificant statistical results were obtained in 
Table 8. Columns 1 and 4 of Table 9 show that countervailing impacts between the 
formal and informal credit market segments are involved when it comes to education, 
dependents, assets, credit history and the red books. They tend to make the overall 
effect on credit demand in Table 8 insignificant. An additional year of education of the 
household head significantly reduces the probability of the household demanding credit 
from informal sources. Also, regarding the formal segment, although education is 
insignificantly positive as a determinant of credit demand, it increases the size of the 
loan obtained with around 5 percent given a loan is obtained. In both the formal and 
informal market a household’s asset base plays a significant role. For the formal market 
more assets increase the probability of demand credit; the opposite holds in the informal 
market. This is consistent with productive assets giving more opportunities for 
investments and therefore increased demand for credit from formal sources. On the 
other hand, a larger asset base makes borrowing less necessary in the case of negative 
shocks – hence, a lower probability of borrowing from the informal sector. If a loan is 
obtained, they tend to be larger in both segments. Arguably, this is due to easier access 
to collateral when the asset base is larger. 
 
In addition to the observations outlined above two policy relevant differences are 
apparent between Table 8 and 9. The first relates to credit history (not paid). Recall that 
this dummy variable takes on the value one if the household has previously defaulted 
and zero otherwise. Pooling formal and informal credit demand yields a large positive 
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marginal effect of a ‘bad’ credit history, although, it should be kept in mind that the 
effect is insignificant. Table 9 suggests an explanation for this result. A bad credit 
history significantly increases the probability of demanding credit from an informal 
source – and the effect is large in economic terms. For the formal sector the effect is 
negative, though insignificant. While caution is needed in interpreting this finding, it is 
consistent with ‘bad’ credit history households being unable to secure loans in the 
formal sector and therefore address their demand towards the informal sector. The 
second issue is that of red book coverage of land holdings. A larger share of land with a 
red book means more secure land rights. This in turn should induce investments in 
productivity enhancements due to better ability to put up collateral and more secure 
access to returns from investments (Besley, 1995). In the pooled sample no such effect 
is evident, except from – insignificantly – the province of Quang Nam. Splitting the 
formal and informal credit market gives a large positive effect on formal credit demand 
bordering significance. Demand for informal credit is significantly and negatively 
affected by red book status suggesting that the red book enables households to obtain 
loans on better terms in the formal sector than those available in the informal sector. 
 
It is of interest to look further at households, who obtained a loan from both a formal 
and an informal credit source. In total 29 households received a loan from both 
segments of the credit market in 2002. Given the limited number of households it is not 
feasible to make a combined formal analysis (i.e. via a trivariate probit estimation) of 
demand characteristics. Instead some important statistics is presented in what follows. 
For the 29 households over half (16) of the loans from the informal segment was from 
relatives carrying zero interest. The loans from relatives do not differ in the average 
loan amount compared to loans obtained from relatives by households not having loans 
from both sources. However, loans taken out from moneylenders charging interest are 
on average of half the size of the loans taken by other households. This is similar with 
the formal loans, which are also around half the size compared with the rest of the 
sample. Regarding the duration, informal loans tend to have lower and formal loans 
longer duration for households involved in both segments. It is difficult to arrive at one 
simple explanation consistent with these observed patterns. There is nothing to suggest 
that 29 households were rationed from formal lending, and therefore had to turn to the 
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informal segment of the credit market. Rather, it would seem that these households rely 
on formal lenders for longer term (i.e. longer than average) financing and on relatives 
and other private lenders for short term financing. However, a larger sample would be 
needed to unravel these explanations. 
 
To sum up, the only variables in Tables 8 and 9 for which little systematic influence on 
credit demand can be uncovered one way or the other appear to be the information 
variable and hospitalization, which are admittedly rather crude proxies. Moreover, the 
data suggest as just alluded to that a key underlying distinction between formal and 
informal credit demand is that formal demand is particularly driven by factors such as 
total land and to a lesser extent by red book status. This reflects the need for credit for 
production and the management of assets whereas the effect of age does not differ.  In 
contrast, informal credit is, in addition to being negatively associated with age and 
education positively dependent on the credit history (not paid) and on the number of 
dependents, reflecting household need to smooth consumption and address external 
shocks. When households have assets they are better able to manage these needs 
without relying on informal credit as reflected in the coefficient of total assets. Yet, 
being connected, for example, is statistically important throughout.  
 
Finally, when it comes to provincial differences striking results stand out. In terms of 
the informal credit market Quang Nam and Long An have significantly less activity. For 
Long An this is more than compensated for by very high formal market participation 
relative to the base province of Ha Tay, whereas Quang Nam also has lower activity in 
the formal market (not significant). The province of Quang Nam is clearly a relatively 
underdeveloped province (as compared to Ha Tay) in terms of both formal and informal 
credit demand, whereas Long An stands out as the most developed province. All in all, 
the statistical results confirm that location specific circumstances (including the general 
level of development) are critical in understanding credit demand.  
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5. DETERMINANTS OF CREDIT RATIONING 
(a) Rationing by formal lenders, VBARD 
 
The Vietnam Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development (VBARD) is as shown in 
Table 2 by far the largest single lender to rural households in Vietnam, accounting for 
around one third of the total market in volume and more than half when loan size is 
accounted for.19 It is therefore central to rural development that credit is disbursed 
efficiently by the VBARD. While a complete evaluation of the lending practices of 
VBARD is outside the scope of the present paper, our data make it possible to identify 
both the characteristics of households, who obtained credit from VBARD, and the 
characteristics of households, who had their application turned down. The sample size 
for those, who got their application rejected, becomes fairly small, so results should be 
interpreted as indicative only.  
 
[Table 10 about here] 
 
Table 10 displays the mean values of the variables examined in Section 4. Total land 
holdings and total assets are larger for households, who were approved for a loan than 
for rejected households. However, the difference between the two groups is only 
statistically significant for total land holdings, likewise for sex and the dummies for Phu 
Tho and Long An. Households residing in Phu Tho are ‘overrepresented’ among the 
rejected households whereas the opposite holds for Long An. If any gender 
discrimination is present it is a bias against men. Worth noting is also that education and 
family size are both larger (although not significant) in the rejected group; and loan 
default rates are clearly important in explaining rejection, at least for other formal 
lenders and informal lenders. In the province of Quang Nam few households apply for a 
loan and few households are rejected, in line with the results for credit demand analysed 
in Section 4.  
 
Given that VBARD specialises in production lending with relatively large loans 
compared to the other lending institutions (see Table 6) the findings in Table 10 are 
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sensible. They once again spell out that the regional differences in the credit market are 
substantial and they illustrate that VBARD is focusing its lending on relatively large 
land and livestock holders.20
 
(b) Characteristics of credit rationed households 
 
Earlier theoretical literature on rural credit markets in developing countries is based on 
the assumption that all households have a positive demand for credit (see Eswaran and 
Kotwal, 1989 and Braverman and Stiglitz, 1989). Thus, all households, who have not 
obtained credit within a given period, are considered credit rationed.21 Several more 
recent papers have, however, documented that this assumption may be too restrictive in 
empirical analysis, see Kochar (1997). 
 
In this section we pursue this theme and identify factors at the household level, which 
influence the probability that a household with given characteristics is credit 
constrained. It would have been interesting to study the formal and informal sectors 
separately, but the number of households, who had loan applications rejected, is as 
already mentioned quite low.22 Nevertheless, the characteristics which influence credit 
rationing are likely to be at least similar in the formal and informal segments making it 
worthwhile to pursue the issue in the aggregated sample. Similarly, because of the 
sample composition, it is not feasible to augment variables with province level 
dummies. While this is a drawback, interesting results still emerge from the analysis. 
 
Importantly, a household is defined as being credit rationed if it has both applied for a 
loan (in either the formal or the informal credit market) and had the application 
rejected.23 In this setting the methodology differs from the one used in the section on 
credit demand. From household responses it can be established whether a household 
demands credit. However, for those households, who did not apply for credit, it is 
impossible to observe what the lender’s decision would have been had those households 
actually applied. This sample selectivity issue is addressed by specifying a bivariate 
variant of Heckman’s selection model (Wooldridge 2002) as follows: 
 25
 
*
1 1 1 1 1
*
2 2 2 2 2
1 0,0 (
1 0,0
i i i i
i i i i
)
( )
y if y x u otherwise rationed
y if y x u otherwise applied
δ
δ
= = + >
= = + >   (5) 
 
Error terms are assumed to be bivariate normally distributed with zero mean, unit 
variance and correlation .uρ  Thus ~ 1 2( , )i iu u (0,0,1,1, )ubinorm ρ and 1iy  (i.e. a loan is 
approved or rejected) is observed only when . The vectors of explanatory 
variables,
2 0iy >
1 2,i ix x , have one as their first element.  The second equation is our selection 
equation determining characteristics, which influence the household decision to apply 
for a loan ( ). Results from Section 4 are used in specifying this selection 
equation.
2 1iy =
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Given that a household applies for credit ( 2 1iy = ), the outcome of the application 
process can be observed from the equation 1– 1 1iy =  if the household were awarded the 
loan and zero in the case of rejection. Characteristics at the household, commune and 
province level are aggregated together in respectively 1ix  and 2ix  to ease notation. 
 
This simultaneous approach allows us to try to identify determinants of credit rationing 
taking into account the possible selection bias in households applying for credit. Testing 
for independence between the two equations is equivalent to testing the hypothesis that 
uρ  equals zero.  
 
[Table 11 about here] 
 
Table 11 displays the results from four different specifications of the equation 
determining the probability of a household being rationed. The first column (base 
applied) shows the coefficients (not marginal effects) from the selection equation, 
including all of the variables used in Section 4. The same selection equation is used for 
all four specifications. Only results from the selection equation for the first specification 
are reported. Due to the simultaneous nature it differs slightly across specification. 
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Although not completely comparable – because of the difference in specification 
described above and since demanding and having applied for a loan differs in some 
circumstances, it is instructive to compare the results from the selection equation with 
those in Table 8. For the significant variables the results from the selection equation 
conform well with the demand equation in Table 8 – adding further robustness to the 
results. Thus, numbers of adults, livestock and being connected increase the probability 
of having applied for a loan. Also, residing in Quang Nam lowers the propensity to 
apply for a loan substantially whereas the opposite is true for Long An. 
 
Our base specification of rationing is shown in column two (specification 1). We 
include only variables, which are believed to affect the borrower’s ability to pay back 
the loan, and which are (at least in principle) observable to the lender, together with 
provincial dummies. Thus, we include land and assets, education,25 feed expenditures as 
a proxy for livestock holdings, credit history and the share of land for which the 
borrower has a red book. This last variable is a proxy of the borrower’s prospective for 
entering the land market to secure repayment of the loan. Arguably, the number of 
adults might also be a useful indicator of repayment ability. We do not include it in the 
rationed base since the lender is in effect unable to monitor the effort to repay. It might 
be possible for the lender to force sale of land in case of default, but not to force people 
to get an income-generating job. Including adults bring no qualitative changes to the 
result (not reported). 
 
A bad credit history and education are significant with the expected signs. Also the 
coefficients for assets and the share of land with a red book have expected signs, 
although they fail conventional significance tests. The larger the share of land for which 
the household has a red book the lower the probability of being rejected credit. The sign 
of the coefficient on the land variable is contrary to prior expectations, but insignificant. 
The provincial dummies reveal significant differences in rationing given our controls 
among the four provinces studied here. Thus, the probability of having a loan 
application approved is, once we control for the propensity to apply for credit, 
statistically different among the various provinces considered here. Relative to Ha Tay, 
the households in the provinces of Phu Tho, Quang Nam and Long An all have lower 
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probabilities of having a loan rejected. The differences within these three provinces are 
not significant. The statistically significant results also carry economic significance. For 
instance, since in the sample around 9 percent of loan applications are rejected, a 6 
percent increase in the probability of being rationed as a result of ‘bad’ credit history 
constitutes a large relative increase in the risk of being rejected. To a lesser extent the 
same can be said about the differences between Ha Tay and the other provinces. 
 
Apart from land holdings, the only variable, which does not conform to our prior, is the 
proxy for livestock. A lender should be more willing to lend if the borrower has 
livestock which can be sold in case of default. In contrast, the coefficient on feed is 
positive, suggesting a greater possibility of being rejected, but the coefficient is 
insignificant. 
 
Finally, the hypothesis of all coefficients (excluding the constant) being equal to zero in 
the rationing equation is rejected at less than 1 percent, and it appears that the selection 
framework is in the present case not strictly necessary as the independence of equations 
cannot be rejected. 
 
In specifications 2, 3 and 4, we augment the rationed base regression with other 
variables from Table 8, but which should not in theory affect lender decisions given the 
information contained in the variables from the base regression. In column three 
(specification 2), we include age and gender of the head of household. It is evidently of 
interest to uncover whether systematic biases against women are present in the process 
of reviewing credit applications. We find no such bias here. Keeping in mind that the 
gender variable has woman household head as its base, the data suggest that women 
who apply for credit are in fact more likely than men to be approved for a loan. Again, 
note that the size of the marginal effect is not trivial. This result is statistically 
significant at the 10 percent level, whereas the corresponding age parameter is clearly 
insignificant. The gender result must be interpreted with caution. The nature of this 
issue is complex, and we recall that we do not have individual level information on loan 
allocations, only at household level. So robustness and channels of influence is an issue 
for further study. However, our result does correspond with observations made in 
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studies of the allocation of firm credit in Vietnam (see World Bank, 2005). With respect 
to the other base line variables, signs, magnitudes and significance levels are virtually 
unchanged for all variables. The test of independence of equations is rejected at the 10 
percent level. 
 
The third specification (in column 4) looks at the effect of distance to a district centre 
(distance) and a proxy for the household information level (information). We offer no 
prior expectations about the sign of the distance coefficient; but outreach is of particular 
concern, so insights on the importance of this variable is potentially important 
information in assessing how credit should be expanded in rural Vietnam. The rationed 
baseline variables remain virtually unchanged in terms of signs and magnitudes, except 
for the coefficients of provincial dummy variables Phu Tho and Long An which become 
marginally insignificant. In fact, specification 3 changes very little, and while distance 
has a negative and information a positive parameter, they are clearly statistically 
insignificant. Information has very little explanatory power with a t-value of 0.43, and 
the t-value of distance is not much higher at 0.18. 
 
Finally, in the fourth specification we try to isolate the effect of being well connected 
(with respect to contacts in credit institutions). This is done by introducing a dummy 
variable (connections) equal to one if the household has contacts in any credit 
organisation. The estimated coefficient is negative and significant at 10 percent, which 
corresponds to stating that being well connected within credit institutions promotes the 
application process. Relative to the base specification, the coefficients are very robust to 
the inclusion of the connectedness variable. In this last specification the test of 
independence of equations cannot be rejected.26   
 
Looking at the four sets of simultaneous regressions overall it is evident that the signs of 
the coefficients in the base regression are very robust. Households with older heads are 
less likely to apply for credit. All else equal, elder households are less likely to 
undertake risks (i.e. apply for loan where repayment is uncertain), but when they apply 
they neither gain particular preferential treatment nor are they rationed. There is some 
evidence that males and females are treated differently in the application process, but 
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we interpret this result with caution as indicated above. It seems likely that better 
educated households are more likely to know when an application will be rejected and 
the data strongly suggest that once they have applied they are not being discriminated, 
quite the contrary. The better educated the household head, the better the probability of 
approval.  
 
Feed, i.e. the measure of assets in the form of livestock, has the expected positive sign 
in the selection, but plays no role in rationing. This is slightly surprising since if a 
household decides to apply for a loan then – everything else equal – the ability to repay 
measured in terms of assets, which can be transferred to the lender should be negatively 
related to the probability of being rationed. Yet, we also note that the relevant 
parameters in the rationing equations are statistically insignificant. 
 
Furthermore, as one would expect, the indicator for a bad credit history (not paid), 
which indicates that a household have defaulted on a loan instalment previously, is 
positively related to being credit rationed. Yet, it does not appear to deter household 
from applying in any statistically significant manner, although as noted in the previous 
section, demand for credit shifts from formal to informal lenders. While clearly 
important to rural credit, overall, the possession of a red book is not significant when it 
comes to the decision to apply, but there is some indication that those households who 
have a red book are less likely to be rationed. The variable controlling for connections 
has the expected sign in both the selection and rationing equations, but it is only 
significant at 10 percent level in the rationing equation. The household information 
level might be said to have the ‘wrong’ signs in both selection and rationing. We offer 
no convincing story for this result but note that this is statistically insignificant. The 
same goes for the distance parameter, though it should be kept in mind that the 
regressions in this section are pooled over formal and informal lending institutions. 
Turning to the province dummies, it is clear that provincial differences play a role as all 
three dummy variables are statistically significant in the majority of specifications. 
However, in case of rationing it seems that only Ha Tay differs significantly from the 
three other provinces.  
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In general the sign of most coefficients as analysed in this section are in line with what 
we expected a priori. We acknowledge that there are a few exceptions and that several 
variables lack statistical significance. However, we believe this is more likely to be a 
feature of the data not having enough variability in central variables. Given the regional 
differences pointed out above it is also likely that the dummy variables capture a bit too 
much of the differences in the data. Ideally and with unlimited data, interacting the 
dummies (as done in Section 4) with core variables to detect province specific effects 
would be desirable. This is left for future research when better data become available. 
 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
 
Little is known about the characteristics and the operation of the rural credit market in 
Vietnam. This paper was written with the aim of helping to fill this gap based on a new 
data set covering 932 households in four provinces (Ha Tay, Phu Tho, Quang Nam and 
Long An) surveyed in early 2003. In the formal analysis this data was complemented 
with information available in the 2002 Vietnam Household Living Standard Survey 
(VHLSS). A number of general observations emerge, which deserve close attention in 
efforts to further develop the existing credit system.  
 
An active and growing rural credit market exists in Vietnam, and formal credit is clearly 
expanding its share of total credit. This is in line with the general rapid development of 
the economy, and overall interest rates have also fallen suggesting that market 
integration is in fact progressing. In parallel, a sizeable informal sector remains in 
existence, accounting for about one-third of all loans, and reflecting that poor rural 
households continue to rely on informal networks and relatives. Different segments in 
the loan market serve different needs, and we note that the formal sector focuses almost 
entirely on production loans and asset accumulation. In contrast, both the descriptive 
statistics and the formal analysis in this paper demonstrate that households actually 
demand loans for other purposes, such as consumption smoothening and health 
expenditures. Such loans are often obtained in response to temporary shocks (i.e. having 
a person hospitalized) and thus work as a consumption smoothing device.  
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 Because of the limited formal lending for consumption smoothening, households direct 
this demand for credit at private money lenders. This may well be welfare enhancing if 
the money lenders offer alternatives preferred by the borrower. Yet, to the extent that 
the borrower can provide collateral (i.e. in the form of land) it should in theory make no 
difference to formal lenders whether a loan is used for production purposes or for 
temporary consumption smoothing. If the formal sector entered the market for non-
production loans (on financially sustainable terms) this would provide borrowers with 
an alternative to private money lenders. This could well be welfare increasing, 
especially for marginalized low-income households. They have limited connections, and 
this characteristic is as shown in Sections 4 and 5 a strongly constraining factor for 
credit demand in both the formal and the informal sector. In the informal sector it is 
moreover typical that older and better educated households have less credit demand. In 
contrast, a larger number of dependents and a bad credit history tend to increase a 
household’s informal credit demand. This does not necessarily reflect market failure, 
but it does suggest there is need and space for careful, well designed public action in 
expanding credit facilities. The social returns of such action may well be high. 
 
Another key characteristic of the rural credit market in Vietnam is the one-way 
interaction with the land market. Land (with a red book) is widely used as collateral and 
plays a fundamental role in the operation of the credit market. Land is a statistically 
significant determinant of overall credit demand. This result is as shown in Section 4 
driven by formal credit demand geared towards production purposes and asset 
management. This further reinforces the above conclusion about the need for carefully 
metered public action; but it is in parallel striking that there is almost no credit-based 
land acquisition in rural areas. This highlights the very considerable challenges, which 
remain to be addressed in establishing the necessary market based institutional 
framework for a more efficient functioning of the economy.  
 
It comes as no surprise that land is widely used as collateral. Land is immobile and its 
quality cannot be changed at short notice. Yet, an active land market depends critically 
on a well functioning credit system for land transactions. The lack of such a market is 
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due to both supply (i.e. lending institutions do not generally finance land transactions) 
and to the demand side. Accordingly, the land section of the present household survey 
reveals that the land market among non-relatives is very thin indeed. However, 
productivity increases in rural agriculture will depend crucially on land consolidation 
and development in the years to come. The demand for loans to finance land 
transactions may appear small at present, but formal lending institutions should actively 
prepare for a more active role in this market. This will as well require that 
complementary institutions are put in place with the capacity to value land, and also an 
effective legal system to solve potential land disputes will be required. 
 
The most striking and cross-cutting general insight emerging from this paper is the 
extent of regional differences in almost all aspects of the credit market. Some broad 
national generalizations are as already discussed possible. At the same time, it is in 
designing public policy indispensable to be very careful about the region, the household 
group and the market segment in question. The formal sector accounts for around 50 
percent of loans in Ha Tay and Phu Tho. Long An and Quang Nam have much higher 
shares, but this characteristic is a reflection of very different levels of development in 
these two provinces. Few households in Quang Nam obtain credit, and credit demand in 
this province is clearly limited compared to the other provinces in our sample. This is so 
both overall and in the various market segments. Pooling demand for formal and 
informal credit may blur the picture of rural credit demand. Countervailing effects are at 
work between the formal and informal credit segments when it comes to education, 
distance, credit history and also the provincial dummy effects differ. 
 
In sum, the econometric analysis confirms that specificity and the general level of 
development are fundamental in understanding credit demand in Vietnam. A ‘one size 
fits all’ approach to expanding credit is not going to be the most effective. This 
dimension therefore needs to be kept in mind in the planned expansion of rural credit 
through the Vietnam Bank for Social Policies. The VBSP aims at operating a large 
number of new branches throughout Vietnam (World Bank, 2003). An additional 
observation in this regard is that expansion needs to be carefully metered to take 
account of the need for credit in areas where access is presently low – such as in Quang 
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Nam. In Ha Tay and Phu Tho the informal sector is sizeable and as such compensate for 
an insufficiently developed formal sector, whereas the formal market is already much 
better developed in Long An. It is in this context also to be noted as shown in Section 5 
that VBARD is focusing its lending on relatively large land and livestock holders. We 
stress that regional differences in credit rationing seems to be limited, although there are 
small differences showing up once selection is accounted for. In Quang Nam few 
households apply for credit and few are rejected. On the other hand, the analysis in 
Section 5 reveals that households with a bad credit history are more likely to get 
rationed. This merits attention as these households in all likelihood include those 
households, who are subject to shocks and who find it difficult to manage their lives. To 
detect province specific effects, it would, given the regional differences pointed out 
above, be desirable to inter-act the provincial dummy variables with a larger number of 
core variables. Yet, this is left for future research when better data become available, 
and the same goes for the challenge of establishing the degree of credit rationing which 
households experience. 
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NOTES 
 
1 See for example Kovsted et al. (2004). 
2 Diagne, Zeller and Sharma (2000) provide a series of other references. 
3 See Duong and Izumida (2002) and McCarty (2001) for earlier work on rural credit and microfinance 
issues in Vietnam. 
4 For documentation and the questionnaire used see Barslund et al. (2004).  
5 Some 28 households interviewed during the VHLSS could not be interviewed and had to be excluded in 
the ILSSA survey.  
6 The following website http://www.worldbank.org.vn/data/household_survey.htm provides access to a 
complete description of the 2002 VHLSS and the questionnaire. 
7 Retrospective questions always entail a risk of imprecise or erroneous answers. However, obtaining a 
loan is not an ‘every year’ event and as such is more likely to be remembered correctly than more 
recurring events. Furthermore, taking out a loan often coincides with ‘big’ events such as major shocks or 
purchases, which are likely to be recalled correctly.  
8 The credit market section of the ILSSA survey is Module B (questions 168-224), with three sections: B1 
for loans actually received, B2 for loans not received, and B3 on general questions. 
9 The VBP has recently been renamed the Vietnam Bank for Social Policies (VBSP). VBARD and VBP 
are associated in the sense that they often share office facilities. See World Bank (2003) and Kovsted et 
al. (2004) for a more detailed description of the institutional set up. 
10 Private Trader was also a category in the questionnaire. It turned out that this group does not play an 
important role in the credit market in the four provinces studied. 
11 See appendix A for the full list of institutions included in the questionnaire. 
12 If loans for primary consumption are only obtainable from informal sources and there is a general 
increase in incomes, which makes consumption loans less needed, a change in the composition of loans 
may be expected. Similarly if it is easier to obtain loans for specific purposes such as production, rather 
than for consumption smoothening or health purposes. 
13 The questions were, respectively: “What was the stated purpose of the loan (select one for each loan)?” 
and “What did your household mainly use the loan for (select one for each loan)?” 
14 This includes buying/building a house, the few instances of buying land and re-lending and buying 
other assets. 
15 Only households obtaining a loan were used in this stage, since loan amounts are not available for 
rejected and self-constrained households. 
16 All regressions were also carried out on a sample excluding outliers, defined as observations, situated 
outside an interval of three standard deviations from the mean. All qualitative results remained 
unchanged. Full tables are available on request. 
17 We are not able to specify a fully unconstrained model (i.e. with regional interaction terms on all 
variables). Our data are sampled in clusters (46 different clusters/enumeration areas) and, thus, have less 
degrees of freedom in our estimation procedures than with an ‘unclustered’ approach. The advantage is 
that the significance of our statistical results are robust to observations being independent between but not 
within clusters. Assuming independence of all observations strengthens our results considerably. 
18 Self-rationed households did not indicate in which sector they would have applied if they had applied 
for a loan. Thus, self-rationed households were treated as not demanding credit in the sector specific 
analysis.  
19 The second most important state bank, Vietnam Bank for the Poor (VBP) has recently been reorganised 
and is now operating under the umbrella of the Vietnam Bank for Social Policies (VBSP), which is 
scheduled for a large expansion in the years to come (World Bank, 2003).  
20 While a general characteristic, this effect does to some extent reflect higher BARD lending activity in 
Long An, which also tends to have larger farms. 
21 In what follows, the terms credit constrained and credit rationed are used interchangeably. 
22 In 2002, 25 households in the sample of the 875 had their loan application rejected by a lending 
institution (formal and informal). For the sample of 932 households the number was 29 households. 
23 In fact a household may be approved for a loan smaller than it applied for. These households are also to 
some extent credit rationed. We asked questions about amount obtained, amount wanted and amount 
applied for to identify households rationed in the loan amount. In our sample 21 households reported 
(credibly) that they were rationed in the amount they obtained in 2002. For simplicity these households 
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are considered not rationed in the present study. The qualitative results hold if we include the 21 
household (except three households which were rationed in large loan amounts) as rationed. 
24 It is recalled that the definitions for households demanding credit and applying for credit differ as 
described above. 
25 See Nga Nguyet Nguyen (2004) who reports significantly increasing returns to schooling in recent 
years. 
26 A fifth specification with the remaining three variables from Table 8, i.e. including Adults, Dependents, 
and Hospitalization was also carried out. This changed none of the key results discussed, and provided no 
further insights except that the number of dependents is potentially important. This specification is 
therefore left out here, but results are available on request. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
Lending institutions in the questionnaire: 
 
Bank for the Poor (includes National Poverty Alleviation Program)   
Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development    
Other State-Owned Bank      
National Employment Generation Program    
Other National Government Program     
Other (non National) Poverty Alleviation Program    
Private Bank       
Farmers’ Union      
Veterans’ Union      
Women’s Union      
People’s Credit Funds      
Other Credit Associations      
Private Trader      
State Owned Enterprise (SOE)       
International Organisation      
Private Money Lender      
Friends/Relatives      
Other (please specify)      
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APPENDIX B 
 
List of variables 
Name in tables Definition Source 
Demand for credit Dummy variable equal to 1 if household demanded credit in 2002 ILSSA 2002 
Age Age of household head in years VHLSS 2002 
Total land Total landholdings in 1,000 m2 ILSSA 2002 
Gender Dummy variable equal to 1 if the household is male and equal to 0 if 
household head is female 
VHLSS 2002 
Education Education of household head, number of years of schooling VHLSS 2002 
Adults Number of adults defined as household members between 15 and 65 
years of age and not studying 
VHLSS 2002 
Dependents  Number of dependents are full time students and household members 
aged less than 15 or above 65 years 
VHLSS 2002 
Feed Expenditures on livestock feed during last 12 months in mill. Dong VHLSS 2002 
Province dummies Ha Tay, Phu Tho, Quang Nam, Long An.  ILSSA 2002 
Total assets Total value of assets in mill. Dong VHLSS 2002 
Distance Distance to district centre in km VHLSS 2002 
Hospitalization Dummy variable equal to 1 if at least one household member hospitalized 
within the last 12 months and equal to 0 is no member hospitalized 
VHLSS 2002 
Connections Dummy variable equal to 1 if anyone in the household has contacts in the 
existing credit institutions 
ILSSA 2002 
Red book The share of household land area for which a red book is in hand ILSSA 2002 
Information Dummy variable equal to 1 if the household reads the newspaper People VHLSS 2002 
Alternative information Index where having a radio counts 0.5 and a television 1 VHLSS 2002 
Got help Dummy equal one if the household at some point prior to 2001 got help 
from the authorities to apply for a loan 
ILSSA 2002 
Not paid Dummy equal one if the household did at some point prior to 2001 not 
pay a loan instalment in full 
ILSSA 2002 
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TABLES 
 
Table 1. Households distributed by number of loans obtained, 1997-2002 
Number of loans Frequency By province (percent) 
  Ha Tay Phu Tho Quang Nam Long An 
0 289 29 18 53 23 
1 211 19 25 40 7 
2 149 22 24 4 12 
3 112 17 17 1 11 
4 52 6 8 1 6 
5 119 7 8 1 40 
Total 932 100 100 100 100 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on ILSSA Access to Resources Survey 2003. 
 
 
Table 2. Distribution of loans by source (percent)a
 1999 2002 
 Unweighted Weighted by 
loan amount 
Unweighted Weighted by  
loan amount 
VBP 11 5 5 2 
VBARD 44 64 38 56 
Private lenders 8 6 11 4 
Relatives 23 15 24 13 
Union 9 3 12 7 
Others 5 7 10 18 
Total 100 100 100 100 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on ILSSA Access to Resources Survey 2003. 
Note: ‘Unweighted’ refers to the simple distribution of the number of loans. ‘Weighted by 
loan amount’ indicates the distribution of loans where each loan is weighted with loan size. 
a VBP (Vietnam Bank for the Poor, now Vietnam Bank for Social Policies, VBSP), VBARD 
(Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development), Private Lenders (Private moneylenders and 
traders, and friends charging interest), Relatives (relatives and friends charging zero interest), 
Union (Farmers’/Veterans’/Women’s Unions and People’s Credit Funds), Other (Other 
institutions not mentioned above – see Appendix A) 
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Table 3. Rural credit, 1997-2002 
 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Formal       
Loan size (’000 Dong)
 a
5,191 4,657 4,583 5,360 6,400 8,426 
Interest (percent per month) 1.2 1.1 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.9 
Number of loans 70 130 168 223 279 250 
Informal – interest       
Loan size (’000 Dong) 3,222 7,686 3,196 3,206 2,468 3,904 
Interest (percent per month) 3.8 3.8 3.6 3.0 3.0 1.8 
Number of loans 9 18 24 31 47 55 
Relative – zero interest       
Loan size (’000 Dong) 4,175 2,107 2,375 2,522 3,558 2,602 
Interest (percent per month) 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Number of loans 20 29 51 69 76 84 
Total       
Loan size (’000 Dong) 4,807 4,548 3,983 4,547 5,403 6,529 
Interest (percent per month) 1.2 1.2 1.0 0.9 1.0 0.8 
Number of loans 99 177 243 323 402 389 
Consumer price inflation   
Monthly consumer price inflation (pct.) 0.26 0.62 0.34 -0.13 -0.03 0.33 
Distribution by source, unweighted ( percent) 
Formal  71 73 69 69 69 64 
Informal 9 10 10 10 12 14 
Relative 20 16 21 21 19 22 
Distribution by source, weighted by loan size ( percent) 
Formal  76 75 80 81 82 83 
Informal 6 17 8 7 5 8 
Relative 18 8 13 12 12 9 
Sources: Authors’ calculations based on ILSSA Access to Resources Survey 2003 and IMF, World Economic 
Outlook Database, September 2006. 
Note: ‘unweighted’ and ‘weighted by loans size’ as defined in Table 2. 
a
 At the time of the survey in January 2003 the exchange rate was around 14,000 VND per USD.  
 
 
Table 4. Loan use (percent of total loans each year), 1997-2002 
Year Production 
Repayment of 
existing loan Asset accumulation Health 
General 
consumption 
1997 69 3 18 9 2 
1998 70 2 11 3 15 
1999 74 2 14 4 6 
2000 73 3 11 4 9 
2001 71 3 12 6 9 
2002 68 4 12 6 11 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on ILSSA Access to Resources Survey 2003. 
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Table 5. Characteristics of loans obtained, 2002 
  Informal segment 
 Formal segment Private lenders Friends (zero interest) 
Number of loans 250 55 84 
Loan amount (1,000 Dong) 8,426 3,904 2,602 
Duration (average number of months) 15 (N=248) 9 (N=24) 4 (N=11) 
 – Unspecified duration (percent) 1 56 87 
Interest (percent per month) 0.87 1.78 0 
Collateral (percent of loans) 71 0 0 
Partial default a (percent) 8 11 1 
Provinces: Pct. Pct. Pct. 
 – Ha Tay (percent) (N=126) 52 14 35 
 – Phu Tho (percent) (N=106) 50 21 29 
 – Quang Nam (percent) (N=24) 77 8 15 
 – Long An (percent) (N=118) 88 10 2 
Distribution of loans by source and province (weighted by loan size) 
 
VBP VBARD 
Private 
lenders Relatives Union Others 
 – Ha Tay (percent) (N=126) 3 32 6 22 14 22 
 – Phu Tho (percent) (N=106) 4 42 10 27 7 12 
 – Quang Nam (percent) (N=24) 4 73 2 6 3 11 
 – Long An (percent) (N=118) 1 76 2 3 1 18 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on ILSSA Access to Resources Survey 2003. 
a Partial default is the default rate measured as the percentage of loans where households have defaulted. 
 
 
Table 6. Use of loan by credit source (percent), 2002 
  Informal segment  
Use of loan: 
Formal 
segment 
(N = 250) 
Private lenders 
(N = 55) 
Relatives 
(zero interest) 
(N = 84) 
Total 
Production 81 55 36 68 
Repayment of other loans 4 9 1 4 
Asset accumulation 9 5 23 12 
Health expenditure  3 11 12 6 
Consumption 3 20 29 11 
Total 100 100 100 100 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on ILSSA Access to Resources Survey 2003. 
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Table 7. Demand for credit: summary statistics, 2002a
 Nb Mean Nc Mean Std. dev. Min Max 
        
Demand for credit 932 0.34 875 0.367 0.48 0 1 
Age  932 47.74 875 47.61 14.31 22 93 
Total land (1,000 m2)  932 6.33 875 6.49 15.44 0.02 177 
Total land squared 932 265.5 875 280.2 1874.4 0.00 31,152 
Gender (male=1) 932 0.80 875 0.81 0.40 0 1 
Education 932 6.33 875 6.47 3.35 0 12 
Adults  932 2.44 875 2.46 1.21 0 10 
Dependents 932 1.93 875 1.96 1.18 0 6 
Feed (mill. Dong) 932 1.38 875 1.44 4.91 0 80 
Ha Tay 932 0.35 875 0.35 0.48 0 1 
Phu Tho 932 0.21 875 0.22 0.42 0 1 
Quang Nam 932 0.23 875 0.21 0.41 0 1 
Long An 932 0.21 875 0.22 0.41 0 1 
Total assets (mill. Dong) 917 12.86 875 13.02 20.91 0 370 
Total assets squared 917 589.4 875 606.3 4938.0 0 137,122
Distance (km) 892 8.82 875 8.75 8.98 0 40 
Information 932 0.22 875 0.21 0.41 0 1 
Hospitalization 932 0.20 875 0.19 0.40 0 1 
Connections 932 0.52 875 0.52 0.50 0 1 
Red book 930 0.78 875 0.79 0.35 0 1 
Not Paid 932 0.08 875 0.08 0.27 0 1 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on ILSSA Access to Resources Survey 2003. 
a For complete definitions see Appendix B. 
b Total number of observations available for each variable. 
c Number of observations used in the empirical analysis. The full sample used contains 875 
households due to missing data on distance and total assets for a total of 55 households, and two 
households had no land in 2001. 
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Table 8. Determinants of credit demand, 2002 
Full sample Reduced sampled
Dependent variable according to 
column headings. 
Probit (demand=1) 
Marginal effects
 a 
 
(1) 
OLSb  
Log(amount) if 
demand=1 
(2) 
Marginal effectsc  
(E amount
x
∂
∂
)
 
(3) 
Probit (demand=1) 
Marginal effects a 
 
(1) 
Age -0.41***   (0.12)  0.0071 (0.0059)   -12.4 (12.6)  -0.30** (0.12) 
Land   0.65** (0.33) -0.0004 (0.0030)    43.7 (46.7)   0.60** (0.28) 
- Long An  -0.66* (0.34)  0.0140*** (0.0041)    -9.5 (54.6)  -0.63** (0.30) 
Gender (male=1)  -6.46 (4.40)  0.2550 (0.2003)    70.4 (408.3)  -2.74 (5.09) 
Education  -0.07   (0.59)  0.0336 (0.0262)    43.6 (60.0)  -0.03 (0.57) 
Adults   3.25**  (1.32) -0.0610 (0.0590)    64.6 (148.1)   3.41*** (1.31) 
Dependents   0.81 (1.35) -0.0038 (0.0672)    34.5 (144.6)   0.56 (1.53) 
Feed (mill. Dong)   0.63* (0.34)  0.0374*** (0.0102)  107.5** (53.7)   0.64* (0.34) 
Total assets (mill. Dong)   0.10 (0.08)  0.0077** (0.0031)    20.8** (9.3)   0.14* (0.07) 
Distance (km)  -0.45 (0.49) -0.0212 (0.0154)   -65.7 (51.7)  -0.51 (0.54) 
- Phu Tho   1.49** (0.62)  0.0089 (0.0154)    97.8 (68.3)   1.65*** (0.63) 
- Quang Nam  -1.48** (0.72)  0.0184 (0.0474)   -61.9 (240.2)  -1.62 (1.09) 
Information  -3.73 (4.43)  0.2715 (0.1903)  344.6 (425.1)  -3.76 (4.72) 
Hospitalization   1.83 (4.66)  0.0941 (0.1873)  324.7 (426.3)   0.21 (4.55) 
Connections 12.55*** (3.52) -0.0188 (0.1386)  678.2* (390.9) 11.75*** (3.56) 
Red book  -0.90 (4.84)  0.2155 (0.2704)  397.9 (615.4)   1.04 (5.32) 
- Quang Nam 27.47 (19.74)  0.5103 (0.6656) 6097.3 (10,776) 20.10 (19.60) 
Not Paid   6.43 (6.01) -0.1263 (0.2782)   112.0 (706.9)   4.22 (6.08) 
Phu Tho -14.38*** (4.86) -0.4179** (0.1974) -1282.7** (581.6) -14.93*** (4.65) 
Quang Nam -31.98*** (12.34) -0.2901 (0.7274) -36215.4 (8.8E7) -21.47 (15.09) 
Long An  20.91*** (6.48)  0.6716** (0.2679)  3187.2* (1643.2) 27.67*** (7.27) 
Constant ..  7.112*** (0.4409) .. 
Test: all coefficients are zero 
Wald chi2(21) 
p-value = 0.0000 
F(35,44) 
p-value = 0.0000 
.. Wald chi2(21) 
p-value = 0.0000 
Goodness of fit Mcfadden R2 = 0.13 R2 = 0.35 .. Mcfadden R2 = 0.15 
Number of observations (clusters) 875 (46) 293 (45) 875 817 (46) 
Source: Samples from ILSSA Access to Resources Survey 2003 as described in the main text. 
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis. Level of significance robust for clustering at the enumeration area throughout. *, **, 
***significant at 10, 5 and 1 percent, respectively. 
a Coefficients on continuous variables measure the marginal effect in percentage points on the probability of demanding  
credit, whereas they measure the effect of discrete changes for the dummy variables. All marginal effects are evaluated  
at sample means. 
b Coefficients (semi-elasticities) from OLS regression on log(loan amount). Only received loans included. 
c Marginal effects of coefficients on the unconditional expectation of loan amount evaluated at sample means. Robust standard 
errors obtained by non-parametric bootstrap with a 1000 replications. 
d The reduced sample excludes 58 households from the full sample, who obtained a zero interest loan from friends. 
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Table 9. Determinants of formal and informal credit demand 
Demand Formal 
(Full sample) 
Demand informal 
(Full sample) 
Dependent variable 
according to column 
headings. 
Probit 
(demand=1) 
Marginal effects a 
 
(1) 
OLSb  
Log(amount) if 
demand=1 
(2) 
Marginal effectsc  
(E amount
x
∂
∂
)
 
(3) 
Probit (demand=1)
Marginal effects a 
(4) 
OLSb  
Log(amount) if 
demand=1 
(5) 
Marginal effects c 
( )E amount
x
∂
∂  
(6) 
Age  -0.24** (0.10)  0.014* (0.008)    0.64 (9.3)  -0.23*** (0.08)   0.004 (0.009)  12.6*** (4.0) 
Land   0.32** (0.14)  0.010 (0.007)   35.7*** (10.2)   0.01 (0.09)  -0.016** (0.008)  -4.6 (3.8) 
- Long An  -0.25 (0.16) -0.000 (0.007)  -18.7** (9.3)  -0.03 (0.13)   0.109 (0.083)  14.0 (44.4) 
Gender (male=1)  -3.38 (4.01)  0.196 (0.239)  -59.8 (315.0)  -3.11 (2.51)   0.581** (0.269) 136.9 (143.1) 
Education   0.48 (0.49)  0.052** (0.025)  102.7*** (31.2)  -0.75** (0.34)  -0.015 (0.040)  -31.5 (20.4) 
Adults   2.82** (1.09) -0.058 (0.086)  106.0 (98.5)   0.67 (0.74)  -0.178* (0.104)  -47.5 (54.7) 
Dependents   0.09 (1.33)  0.022 (0.080)    31.4 (91.5)   1.54* (0.79)  -0.042 (0.123)   7.7 (55.3) 
Feed (mill. Dong)   0.53** (0.27) 0.016*** (0.003)    51.5*** (8.7)   0.33** (0.15)   0.058*** (0.005)  40.0*** (9.7) 
Total assets (mill. 
Dong)   0.17*** (0.06)  0.005** (0.002)   16.2*** (3.2)  -0.17*** (0.06)   0.026** (0.012)   5.7 (6.2) 
Distance (km)  -0.53 (0.39) -0.017 (0.012)  -53.7*** (16.0)   0.03 (0.26)   0.006 (0.024)  16.4 (10.4) 
- Phu Tho   1.06** (0.49) -0.008 (0.016)   52.8*** (20.0)   0.35 (0.33)  -0.016 (0.040)   -2.7 (18.2) 
- Quang Nam  -1.03 (1.00) -0.022 (0.064)   -77.5 (64.4)  -0.39 (0.43)   0.034 (0.033)  -13.6 (14.4) 
Information  -1.63 (3.94) -0.140 (0.250)  -237.8 (340.4)  -2.27 (2.15)   0.628** (0.258)  139.8 (217.2) 
Hospitalization  -0.90 (3.01)  0.250 (0.220)   267.1 (433.0)    4.44 (3.25)   0.192 (0.246)  396.3 (307.5) 
Connections   6.96** (2.70)  0.153 (0.132)   648.3** (279.7)   6.74*** (2.33)  -0.278 (0.238)  261.7** (130.7) 
Red book   7.63 (4.84) -0.302 (0.232)   207.8 (283.6)  -5.27* (3.17)   0.417 (0.455)    39.0 (220.9) 
- Quang Nam 11.17 (18.11)   1.102 (0.667)  1817.3** (710.1)   7.83 (9.34)  -1.897 (3.970) -573.6 (1878.6) 
Not Paid  -0.79 (4.37) -0.048 (0.392)  -144.9 (541.1)   7.38* (4.35)  -0.280 (0.543)   -14.2 (250.1) 
Phu Tho  -4.50 (4.50) -0.432 (0.281)  -679.4** (312.1)  -1.04 (4.21)  -0.529 (0.681) -184.0 (292.6) 
Quang Nam  -8.89 (16.75) -0.384 (0.492)  -843.8 (981.1)  -15.4*** (4.62)   1.228 (3.355) -330.4 (885.7) 
Long An  29.91*** (8.51) 0.793*** (.275) 4458.4*** (1288.2)  -8.18*** (2.92)  -0.487 (0.730) -420.5 (316.4) 
Constant .. 7.33*** (.430) .. ..   7.12*** (0.659) 
Test: all coefficients are 
zero 
Wald chi2(42) 
p-value = 0.0000
F(21,20) 
p-value = 0.0000 .. 
Wald chi2(38) 
p-value = 0.0000 
F(21,13) 
p-value = 0.0000 .. 
Goodness of fit 
Wald test ρ=0, p-
value 0.96 R2 = 0.37  
Wald test ρ=0, p-
value 0.84 R2 = 0.34  
Number of observations 
(clusters) 
875 (46) 192 (41) 875 875 (46) 113 (34) 875 
Source: Samples from ILSSA Access to Resources Survey 2003 as described in the main text. 
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis. Robust standard errors and adjustment for clustering at the enumeration area throughout. *, **, 
***significant at 10, 5 and 1 percent, respectively 
a Coefficients on continuous variables measure the marginal effect in percentage points on the probability of demanding  
credit, whereas they measure the effect of discrete changes for the dummy variables. All marginal effects are evaluated  
at sample means. Estimated jointly with bivariate normal error term. Estimate of correlation coefficient: ρ=0.03. 
b Coefficients (semi-elasticities) from OLS regression on log(loan amount). 
c Marginal effect of coefficients on the unconditional expectation of loan amount evaluated at sample means. Standard errors obtained 
by the delta method. 
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Table 10. Household characteristics for approved and rejected loan applications by lendersa
 VBARD Other Formal Lenders Informal Lenders 
Variables Approved Rejected Approved Rejected Approved Rejected 
Full 
Sample 
        
Age 46.44 47.05 46.94 44.33 45.02 47.80 47.61 
Total land (1,000 m2)b 13.52 3.66 4.43 2.54 4.52 10.72 6.49 
Gender (male=1)b 0.85 1.00 0.76 0.67 0.79 0.80 0.81 
Education 6.74 7.05 7.07 6.89 6.65 5.77 6.47 
Adults  2.79 3.16 2.62 2.44 2.51 2.66 2.46 
Dependents 1.96 1.79 1.87 1.67 2.02 2.46 1.96 
Feed (mill. Dong) 2.17 1.49 2.16 0.51 1.54 1.44 1.44 
Ha Tay 0.25 0.16 0.42 0.67 0.51 0.60 0.35 
Phu Thob 0.19 0.58 0.38 0.11 0.35 0.09 0.22 
Quang Nam  0.10 0.05 0.10 0.22 0.03 0.03 0.21 
Long Anb 0.45 0.21 0.10 0.00 0.10 0.29 0.22 
Total assets (mill. 
Dong) 19.49 12.15 11.36 6.47 10.98 11.25 13.02 
Distance (km) 9.75 12.05 7.52 11.94 9.41 7.09 8.75 
Information 0.17 0.21 0.17 0.22 0.19 0.20 0.21 
Hospitalization 0.22 0.16 0.18 0.22 0.24 0.26 0.19 
Connections 0.60 0.68 0.59 0.44 0.61 0.57 0.52 
Red book 0.85 0.83 0.80 0.85 0.74 0.69 0.79 
Not Paid 0.09 0.05 0.06 0.33 0.06 0.17 0.08 
        
Number of 
observations 209 19 124 9 186 35 875 
Source: Samples from ILSSA Access to Resources Survey 2003 as described in the main text. 
a Information for 2001 and 2002 is used, and variable mean values are indicated (see Appendix B for full variable 
definitions). 
b Means are statistically (5 percent) different between the two first columns. 
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Table 11. Credit rationing, 2002  
Variables Base 
Applieda 
1.  
Rationed Base b
2. 
Age, gender b
 
3. 
Distance, 
information b
4. 
Connections b
Age -.0117*** 
 (0.0030)  
0.024  
(0.044)   
Total land (1,000 m2)  
0.0030 
 (0.0039) 
0.022 
 (0.024) 
0.021 
 (0.025) 
0.022 
 (0.025) 
0.029 
 (0.023) 
Gender (male=1) 
-0.2081*  
(0.1076)  
1.379* 
 (.0754)   
Education 
-0.0004  
(0.0162) 
-0.363***  
(0.112) 
-0.390** 
 (0.171) 
-0.375*** 
 (0.112) 
-0.331*** 
 (0.095) 
Adults  
0.0951**  
(0.0387)     
Dependents  
0.0012  
(0.0367)     
Feed (mill. Dong) 
0.0188**  
(0.0078) 
0.054  
(0.056) 
0.050 
 (0.055) 
0.057  
(0.054) 
0.052  
(0.057) 
Total assets (mill. Dong) 
0.0023  
(0.0026) 
-0.019  
(0.034) 
-0.021  
(0.032) 
-0.020  
(0.034) 
-0.016  
(0.032) 
Distance (km) 
0.0002  
(0.0097)    
-0.015 
 (0.082)   
Information 
-0.1726  
(0.1188)   
0.513 
 (1.225)  
Hospitalization 
0.1187  
(0.1312)     
Connections 
0.3686***  
(0.0947)    
-1.554* 
 (0.892) 
Red book 
0.1341  
(0.1360) 
-1.607  
(1.295) 
-1.731 
 (1.223) 
-1.598  
(1.278) 
-1.697 
 (1.263) 
Not paid 
0.1674  
(0.1476) 
6.206*  
(3.586) 
6.571*  
(3.739) 
6.401*  
(3.740) 
6.767* 
 (3.870) 
Phu Tho 
-0.0137  
(0.1599) 
-1.641*  
(0.945) 
-1.648* 
 (0.889) 
-1.488  
(1.015) 
-1.585* 
 (0.945) 
Quang Nam 
-0.7387***  
(0.1807) 
-2.967***  
(0.806) 
-2.987***  
(0.775) 
-2.959*** 
 (0.828) 
-2.940***  
(0.782) 
Long An 
0.3043*  
(0.1650) 
-1.472*  
(0.826) 
-1.510** 
 (0.771) 
-1.366 
 (0.882) 
-1.583** 
 (0.791) 
Constant 
-0.2189  
(0.2540)     
Test: all coefficients are 
zero  
F(9,37),  
p-value = 0.006 
F(11,35),  
p-value = 0.000
F(11,35),  
p-value = 0.017 
F(10,36),  
p-value = 0.004
Test: Independence of 
equations  
Wald test ρ=0,  
p-value 0.14 
Wald test ρ=0, 
p-value 0.07 
Wald test ρ=0,  
p-value 0.06 
Wald test ρ=0, 
p-value 0.38 
      
Number of observations / 
uncensored / clusters  875 / 311/ 46 875 / 311/ 46       875 /  311/ 46  875 / 311/ 46 875 / 311/ 46 
Source: Samples from ILSSA Access to Resources Survey 2003 as described in the main text. 
Note: Standard errors in parenthesis. Robust standard errors and adjustment for clustering at the enumeration area 
throughout. *, **, *** significant at 10, 5 and 1 percent, respectively. 
a Coefficients from the selection equation estimated jointly with ‘Rationed Base’. The selection results from the 
other specification differ only marginally due to the simultaneous structure and are not reported. 
b Marginal effects in percent. 
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